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Artificial neural networks can achieve impressive performances, and even outperform humans
in some specific tasks. Nevertheless, unlike biological brains, the artificial neural networks suffer
from tiny perturbations in sensory input, under various kinds of adversarial attacks. It is therefore
necessary to study the origin of the adversarial vulnerability. Here, we establish a fundamental
relationship between geometry of hidden representations (manifold perspective) and the generaliza-
tion capability of the deep networks. For this purpose, we choose a deep neural network trained
by local errors, and then analyze emergent properties of trained networks through the manifold
dimensionality, manifold smoothness, and the generalization capability. To explore effects of ad-
versarial examples, we consider independent Gaussian noise attacks and fast-gradient-sign-method
(FGSM) attacks. Our study reveals that a high generalization accuracy requires a relatively fast
power-law decay of the eigen-spectrum of hidden representations. Under Gaussian attacks, the
relationship between generalization accuracy and power-law exponent is monotonic, while a non-
monotonic behavior is observed for FGSM attacks. Our empirical study provides a route towards a
final mechanistic interpretation of adversarial vulnerability under adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial deep neural networks have achieved the state-of-the-art performances in many domains such as pattern
recognition and even natural language processing [1]. However, deep neural networks suffer from adversarial attacks [2,
3], i.e., they can make an incorrect classification with high confidence when the input image is slightly modified yet
maintaining its class label. In contrast, for humans and other animals, the decision making systems in the brain are
quite robust to imperceptible pixel perturbations in the sensory inputs [4]. This immediately establishes a fundamental
question: what is the origin of the adversarial vulnerability of artificial neural networks? To address this question, we
can first gain some insights from recent experimental observations of biological neural networks.
A recent investigation of recorded population activity in the visual cortex of awake mice revealed a power law
behavior in the principal component spectrum of the population responses [5], i.e., the nth biggest principal component
(PC) variance scales as n−α, where α is the exponent of the power law. In this analysis, the exponent is always slightly
greater than one for all input natural-image stimuli, reflecting an intrinsic property of a smooth coding in biological
neural networks. It can be proved that when the exponent is smaller than 1 + 2/d, where d is the manifold dimension
of the stimuli set, the neural coding manifold must be fractal [5], and thus slightly modified inputs may cause extensive
changes in outputs. In other words, the encoding in a slow decay of population variances would capture fine details
of sensory inputs, rather than an abstract concept summarizing the inputs. For a fast decay case, the population
coding occurs in a smooth and differentiable manifold, and the dominant variance in the eigen-spectrum captures key
features of the object identity. Thus, the coding is robust, even under adversarial attacks. Inspired by this recent
study, we ask whether the power-law behavior exists in the eigen-spectrum of the correlated hidden neural activity
in deep neural networks. Our goal is to clarify the possible fundamental relationship between classification accuracy,
the decay rate of activity variances, manifold dimensionality and adversarial attacks of different nature.
Taking the trade-off between biological reality and theoretical analysis, we consider a special type of deep neural
network, trained with a local cost function at each layer [6]. Moreover, this kind of training offers us the opportunity
to look at the aforementioned fundamental relationship at each layer. The input signal is transferred by trainable
feedforward weights, while the error is propagated back to adjust the feedforward weights via random quenched
weights connecting the classifier at each layer. The learning is therefore guided by the target at each layer, and
layered representations are created due to this hierarchical learning. These layered representations offer us the neural
activity space for the study of the above fundamental relationship.
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FIG. 1: Schematic illustration of deep neural networks trained with local errors. FC is the short-hand for the fully-connected
module, which performs a non-linear processing. RC refers to the random classifier module, which projects the output of FC to
a 10-dimensional decision space. The red and blue arrows indicate forward and backward propagations, respectively. For the
forward propagation, the input image is transfered through the FCs in a layer wise manner. The FC at each layer l produces
an activation yl, which serves as an input (Il+1) to the next layer, or is further weighted by quenched random weights of a RC
(Sl). After a random projection, the cross-entropy cost (El) is evaluated. The classification error is back-propagated to adjust
the trainable network parameters, through gradients of the cost function with respect to feedforward weights (wl) between
consecutive layers.
II. MODEL
The deep neural network under investigation is shown in Fig. 1. We train the network of L+1 layers (numbered from
0) to classify the MNIST handwritten digits [7]. The first layer serves as an input layer, receiving a 784-dimensional
vector from the MINST dataset. These sensory inputs are then transferred to the next layer in a feedforward manner.
The lth (l ≥ 1) layer has nl neurons connected to a random classifier of a fixed size 10, corresponding to the number of
digit classes. The random classifier means that the connection weight to the classifier is pre-sampled from a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution. The depth L and each layer’s width nl are flexible according to our settings. The strength of
the connection or the weight between neuron i at the layer l− 1 and neuron j at the upper layer l is denoted by wlij ,
which is trainable. Similarly, at the layer l, the weight between neuron i at this layer and neuron j at the neighboring
random classifier is specified by J lij , which is quenched.
For the forward propagation, e.g., at the layer l, we have an input Il and the pre-activation is given by zli =
∑
j w
l
jiI
l
j ,
simply summarizing the input pixels according to the corresponding weights. To ensure that the pre-activation is of
the order one, a scaling factor is often applied to the pre-activation. However, the scaling is not necessary in our task.
A non-linear transfer function is then applied to the pre-activation to obtain an activation defined by yli = f(z
l
i).
Here, we use the rectified linear unit (ReLU) function as the non-linear function, i.e., f(x) = max(0, x). The input of
the next layer l + 1 is the activation of layer l, except for the first layer where the input is a 784-dimensional vector
characterizing one handwritten digit. Meanwhile, the activation of the current layer is also fed to the random classifier,
resulting in a classification score vector whose components Sli =
∑
j J
l
jiy
l
j . The score vector can be transformed into
a classification probability by applying the softmax function, i.e., P li = e
Sli/
∑
j e
Slj . P li can be understood as the
probability of the input-label prediction. To specify the cost function, we first define h as the one-hot representation
for the label of an image. More precisely, hi = δi,q, where q is the digit number of the input image. Finally, the local
error function at the layer l is given by El = −∑i hi lnP li . The local error is nothing but the cross entropy between
3Pl and h. The forward propagation process can be summarized as follows:
I li =
{
yl−1i , l > 1
the i-th pixel in an input, l = 1
zli =
∑
j
wljiI
l
j ,
yli = max(0, z
l
i),
Sli =
∑
j
J ljiy
l
j ,
P li =
eS
l
i∑
j e
Slj
,
El = −
∑
i
hi lnP
l
i .
(1)
The local cost function El is minimized when hi = Pi for every i. The minimization is achieved by the gradient
decent method. The gradient of the local error with respect to the weight of the feedforward layer can be calculated
by applying the chain rule, given by:
∂El
∂wlij
=
(∑
k
(P lk − hk)J ljk
)
f ′(zlj)I
l
i . (2)
Then, all trainable weights are updated by following wlij(t+ 1) = w
l
ij(t)− η ∂E
l
∂wlij
, where t and η indicate the learning
step and the learning rate, respectively. In our settings, J lij is a pre-fixed random Gaussian variables. In practice, we
use the mini-batch-based stochastic gradient descent method. The entire training dataset is divided into hundreds
of mini-batches; after sweeping through all mini-batches, an epoch of learning is completed. The learning is then
tested in an unseen/test dataset. For the standard MNIST dataset, the training set has 60 000 images, and the test
set has 10 000 images. We can conclude whether a test image is correctly classified at the layer l by comparing the
position of the maximum component of the classifier score vector Sl with that of the one-hot label h, i.e., the image
is correctly classified at the layer l if argmaxiS
l
i = argmaxihi. The test accuracy A
l
t is then estimated by the number
of correctly-classified images divided by the total number of images in the test set.
After learning, the input ensemble can be transfered throughout the network in a layer-wise manner. Then, at each
layer, the activity statistics can be analyzed by the eigen-spectrum of the correlation matrix (or covariance matrix).
We use principle component analysis (PCA) to obtain the eigen-spectrum, which gives variances along orthogonal
directions in the descending order. For each input image, the population output of nl neurons at the layer l can be
thought of as a point in the nl-dimensional activation space. It then follows that, for k input images, the outputs can
be seen as a cloud of k points. The PCA first finds the direction with a maximal variance of the cloud, then chooses
the second direction orthogonal to the first one, and so on. Finally, the PCA identifies nl orthogonal directions and nl
corresponding variances. In our current setting, the nl eigenvalues of the the covariance matrix of the neural manifold
explain nl variances. Arranging the nl eigenvalues in the descending order leads to the eigen-spectrum whose behavior
will be later analyzed in the next section.
To consider effects of adversarial examples, we add perturbations δIl to the original input Il at each layer. The
original input is obtained by the layer-wise propagation of an image from the test set. We consider two kinds of
additive perturbations: one is the Gaussian white noise and the other is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
noise [8, 9], representing black-box attacks and white-box attacks, respectively. Each component of the white noise is
an i.i.d random number drawn from zero mean Gaussian distribution with different variances (attack/noise strength),
and each component of the FGSM noise is taken from the gradient of the local cost function at each layer with respect
to the immediate input of this layer. These types of perturbations are given as follows:
δIlG() =  · z, (3a)
δIlF () =  · sgn
(
∂El
∂Il
)
, (3b)
where zi ∼ N (0, 1),  denotes the perturbation magnitude, and sgn(x) ≡ |x|x . In fact, the FGSM attack can be thought
of as an `∞ norm ball attack around the original input image.
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FIG. 2: Typical trajectories of training and test error rates versus training epoch. Lines indicate the train error rate, and the
symbols are the test error rate. The network width of each layer is fixed to N = 200 (except the input layer), with 60 000
images for training and 10 000 images for testing. The initial learning rate η = 0.5 which is multiplied by 0.8 every ten epochs.
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FIG. 3: Eigen-spectrum of layer-dependent correlated activities and the power-law behavior of dominant PC dimensions. (a)
The typical eigen-spectrum of deep networks trained with local errors (L = 8, N = 200). Log-log scales are used. The inset is
the eigen-spectrum measured in the visual cortex of mice (taken from Ref. [5]). (b) An example of extracting the power-law
behavior at the fifth layer in (a). A linear fitting for the first ten PC components is shown in the log-log scale.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we apply our model to clarify the possible fundamental relationship between classification accuracy,
the decay rate of activity variances, manifold dimensionality and adversarial attacks of different nature.
A. Test error decreases with depth
We first show that the deep supervised learning in our current setting works. Fig. 2 shows that the training error
decreases as the test accuracy increases (before early stopping) during training. As the layer goes deeper, the test
accuracy grows until saturation despite a slight deterioration. This behavior provides an ideal candidate of deep
learning to investigate the emergent properties of the layered intermediate representations after learning, without and
with adversarial attacks. Next, we will study in detail how the test accuracy is related to the power-law exponent,
how the test accuracy is related to the attack strength, and how the dimensionality of the layered representation
changes with the exponent, under zero, weak, and strong adversarial attacks.
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FIG. 4: Effects of network width on test accuracy and power-law exponent α. (a) Test accuracy versus layer. Error bars are
estimated over 20 independently training models. (b) α versus layer. Error bars are also estimated over 20 independently
training models.
B. Power-law decay of dominant eigenvalues of the activity correlation matrix
A typical eigen-spectrum of our current deep learning model is given in Fig. 3. Notice that the eigen-spectrum is
displayed in the log-log scale, then the slope of the linear fit of the spectrum gives the power-law exponent α. We
use the first ten PC components to estimate α but not all for the following two reasons: (i) A waterfall phenomenon
appears at the position around the 10th dimension, which is more evident at higher layers. (ii) The first ten dimensions
explain more than 95% of the total variance, and thus they capture the key information about the geometry of the
representation manifold. The waterfall phenomenon in the eigen-spectrum can occur multiple times, especially for
deeper layers [Fig. 3 (a)], which is distinct from that observed in biological neural networks [see the inset of Fig. 3
(a)]. This implies that the artificial deep networks may capture fine details of stimuli in a hierarchical manner. A
typical example of obtaining the power-law exponent is shown in Fig. 3 (b) for the fifth layer. When the stimulus
size k is chosen to be large enough (e.g., k ≥ 2000; k = 3000 throughout the paper), the fluctuation of the estimated
exponent due to stimulus selection can be neglected.
C. Effects of layer width on test accuracy and power-law exponent
We then explore the effects of layer width on both test accuracy and power-law exponent. As shown in Fig. 4 (a),
the test accuracy becomes more stable with increasing layer width. This is indicated by an example of nl = 50 which
shows a large fluctuation of the test accuracy especially at deeper layers. We conclude that a few hundreds of neurons
at each layer is sufficient for an accurate learning.
The power-law exponent also shows a similar behavior; the estimated exponent shows less fluctuations as the layer
width increases. This result also shows that the exponent grows with layers. The deeper the layer is, the larger the
exponent becomes. A larger exponent suggests that the manifold is smoother, because the dominant variance decays
fast, leaving few space for encoding the irrelevant features in the stimulus ensemble. This may highlight the depth in
hierarchical learning is important for capturing key characteristics of sensory inputs.
D. Relationship between test accuracy and power-law exponent
In the following simulations, we use 200 neurons at each layer. The relationship between α and Alt is plotted in
Fig. 5, with error bars indicating the standard errors across 50 independent trainings. The typical value of α grows
along the depth, implying that the coding manifold becomes smoother at higher layers. The clear separation of the
α values between the earlier layer (e.g., the exponent of the first layer is less than one) and the deeper layers may
indicate a transition from non-smooth (a slow decay of the eigen-spectrum) coding to smooth coding. Interestingly,
the test accuracy does not increase with the depth for deeper layers, just simply increasing first and then quickly
drops with a relatively small margin. This suggests that too much smoothness will harm the generalization ability of
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FIG. 5: The power-law exponent α versus test accuracy of the manifold. α grows along the depth, while the test accuracy has
a turnover at the layer 2, and then decreases by a very small margin. Error bars are estimated over 50 independently training
models.
the network, although the impact is not significant and thus limited.
E. Properties of the model under black-box attacks
We first consider the additive Gaussian white noise perturbation to the input representation at each layer. This
kind of perturbation is also called the black-box attack, because it is not necessary to have access to the training
details of the deep learning model, including architectures and loss function. Under this attack, the test accuracy
decreases as the perturbation magnitude increases. As expected from the above results of manifold smoothness at
deeper layers, deeper layers become more robust against the black-box attacks of increasing perturbation magnitude
[Fig. 6 (a, b)]. The -dependence of the power-law exponent shows that the adversarial robustness correlates with
the manifold smoothness at deeper layers, which highlights the fundamental relationship between the adversarial
vulnerability and the fractal manifold [5].
Inspecting carefully the behavior of α as a function of the test accuracy, we can identify two interesting regimes
separated by a turning point at α ∼ 1 [Fig. 6 (c)]. Below the turning point, increasing  results in a clear decreasing
in both Alt and α; Moreover, for the first three layers, a linear relationship can be identified. The linear fitting
coefficient is as high as R2 ∼ 0.99. This observation is very interesting. The underlying mechanism is closely related
to the monotonic behavior of the accuracy or exponent as a function of attack strength. Let us define their respective
functions as fa() and fe(). Then a simple transformation leads to α = fe(f
−1
a (A
l
t)), which suggests that a particular
choice of fa and fe allows for the observed linear relationship, e.g., a linear function. Therefore, how the earlier layer
is affected by adversarial examples with increasing strength plays a vital role in shaping the interesting linear regime.
Above the turning point, the linear fitting fails, and instead, a non-linear relationship takes over. One key reason is
that deeper layers are more robust against adversarial examples in our current setting.
F. Properties of the model under white-box attacks
We then consider the white-box attack—FGSM additive noise perturbation; the results are summarized in Fig 7.
The FGSM attack is much stronger than the black-box attack, as expected from the fact that the loss function and
network architecture knowledge are both used by the FGSM attack. The first few layers display evident adversarial
vulnerability, or completely fail to identity correct class of the input images, while the last deeper layers still show
adversarial robustness to some extent. These deeper layers also maintain a relatively high value of α, although strong
adversarial examples strongly reduce the manifold smoothness especially for layers next to the earlier layers. Under
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FIG. 6: Relationship between test accuracy and power-law exponent α when the input test data is attacked by independent
Gaussian white noises. Error bars are estimated over 20 independently training models. (a) Accuracy versus .  is the attack
amplitude. (b) α versus . (c) Accuracy versus α over different values of . Different symbol colors refer to different layers.
The red arrow points to the direction along which  increases from 0.1 to 4.0, with an increment size of 0.1. The relationship
of Alt(α) with increasing  in the first three layer show a linear function, with the slopes of 0.56, 0.86, and 1.04 respectively.
The linear fitting coefficients R2 are all larger than 0.99. Beyond the third layer, the linear relationship is not evident. For the
sake of visibility, we enlarge the deeper-layer region in (d). A turning point α ≈ 1.0 appears. Above this point, the manifold
seems to become smooth, and the exponent becomes stable even against stronger black-box attacks [see also (b)].
the FGSM attack, the α-Alt relationship becomes complicated, and the linear-nonlinear separation that occurs in the
black-box attacks disappears. However, the high accuracy still implies a high value of α. In particular, when the white-
box perturbation is weak, the system reduces the manifold smoothness by a small margin to get a high accuracy [Fig. 7
(c)]. This can be interpreted as follows. Supported by the trained weights (no adversarial training), the manifold
formed by the adversarial examples takes into account more details (or some special directions pointing to the decision
boundary) of the adversarial examples. Under the FGSM attack, specific pixels with `∞ norm perturbations affecting
strongly the loss function are particularly used to flip the decision output. In this sense, the competition (or trade-off)
between the accuracy and the manifold smoothness captured by α is present. This may explain why there exists a
peak in Fig. 7 (c). The peak also appears in Fig. 7 (b). Both types of peaks have the one-to-one correspondence.
Note that black-box attacks has no such properties.
G. Relationship between manifold linear dimensionality and power-law exponent
The linear dimensionality of a manifold formed by data/representations can be thought of as a first approximation
of intrinsic geometry of a manifold [10, 11], defined as follows:
Dl =
(∑N
i=1 λi
)2
∑N
i=1 λ
2
i
, (4)
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FIG. 7: Relationship between test accuracy and exponent α under the FGSM attack. Error bars are estimated over 20
independently training models. (a) Alt changes with . (b) α changes with . (c) A
l
t versus α over different attack magnitudes.
 increases from 0.1 to 4.0 with the increment size of 0.1. The plot shows a non-monotonic behavior different from that of
white-box attacks in Fig. 6 (c).
where {λi} is the eigen-spectrum of the covariance matrix. Suppose the eigen-spectrum has a power-law decay
behavior as the PC dimension increases, we simplify the dimensionality equation as follows:
D(α) =
(∑N
n=1 n
−α
)2
∑N
n=1 n
−2α '
(N1−α − 1)2(1− 2α)
(N1−2α − 1)(1− α)2 , (5)
where N denotes the layer width, and the approximation
∑N
n=1 n
−α ' ∫ N
1
n−αdn = N
1−α−1
1−α is used to get the second
equality. In the thermodynamic limit, D(α) = [ς(α)]
2
ς(2α) , where ς(α) is the Reimann zeta function. Note that for a small
value of N , a theoretical prediction of D(α) in Fig. 8 (b,c) is obtained by using the first equality (sum).
Results are shown in Fig. 8. The theoretical prediction agrees roughly with simulations under zero, weak and strong
attacks of black-box and white-box types. This shows that using the power-law decay behavior of the eigen-spectrum
in terms of the first few dominant dimensions to study the relationship between the manifold geometry and adversarial
vulnerability of artificial neural networks is also reasonable, as also confirmed by many aforementioned non-trivial
properties about this fundamental relationship. Note that when the network width increases, a deviation may be
observed due to the waterfall phenomenon observed in the eigen-spectrum (see Fig. 3).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the fundamental relationship between the adversarial robustness and the manifold smoothness
characterized by the power-law exponent of the eigen-spectrum. The eigen-spectrum is obtained from the correlated
neural activity on the representation manifold. We choose deep supervised learning with local errors as our target deep
learning model, because of its nice property of allowing for analyzing each layered representation in terms of both test
accuracy and manifold smoothness. We then reveal that the deeper layer has a larger value of α, thereby possessing
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FIG. 8: Relationship between dimensionality D and power-law exponent. (a) D(α) estimated from the integral approximation
and in the thermodynamic limit. N is the layer width. (b) D(α) under the Gaussian white noise attack. The dimensionality
and the exponent are estimated directly from the layered representations given the immediate perturbed input for each layer
[Eq. (4)]. We show three typical cases of attack: no noise with  = 0.0, small noise with  = 0.5 and strong noise with  = 3.0.
For each case, we plot eight results corresponding to eight layers. The green dashed line is the theoretical prediction [Eq. (5)],
provided that N = 35. Error bars are estimated over 20 independently training models. (c) D(α) under the FGSM attack.
The theoretical curve (dashed line) is computed with N = 30. Error bars are estimated over 20 independently training models.
the adversarial robustness against both black- and white-box attacks. In particular, we find a turning point under the
black-box attacks for the Alt(α) curve, separating linear and non-linear relationships. This turning point also signals
the qualitative change of the manifold geometric property. Under the white-box attacks, the exponent-accuracy
behavior becomes more complicated, as isotropic properties of attacks like in Gaussian white noise perturbations do
not hold, which requires that a trade-off between manifold smoothness and test accuracy, given the normal trained
weights (no adversarial training), should be taken.
All in all, although our study does not provide precise mechanisms underlying the adversarial vulnerability, the
empirical works are expected to offer some intuitive arguments about the fundamental relationship between general-
ization capability and the intrinsic properties of representation manifolds inside the deep neural networks, encouraging
10
future mechanistic studies towards the final goal of aligning machine perception and human perception [4].
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